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Abstract
Design efficient lattice-based cryptosystem secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) is a challenge
problem. To the date, full CCA2-security of all proposed lattice-based cryptosystems achieved by using a generic transformations
such as either strongly unforgeable one-time signature schemes (SU-OT-SS), or a message authentication code (MAC) and weak
form of commitment. The drawback of these schemes is that encryption requires separate encryption. Therefore, the resulting
encryption scheme is not sufficiently efficient to be used in practice and it is inappropriate for many applications such as small
ubiquitous computing devices with limited resources such as smart cards, active RFID tags, wireless sensor networks and other
embedded devices.
In this work, for the first time, we introduce an efficient universal random data padding (URDP) scheme, and show how it
can be used to construct a direct CCA2-secure encryption scheme from any worst-case hardness problems in (ideal) lattice in the
standard model, resolving a problem that has remained open till date. This novel approach is a black-box construction and leads to
the elimination of separate encryption, as it avoids using general transformation from CPA-secure scheme to a CCA2-secure one.
IND-CCA2 security of this scheme can be tightly reduced in the standard model to the assumption that the underlying primitive
is an one-way trapdoor function.
Index Terms
ost-quantum cryptography, Lattice-based PKE scheme, Universal random data padding, CCA2-security, Standard modelost-
quantum cryptography, Lattice-based PKE scheme, Universal random data padding, CCA2-security, Standard modelP
I. INTRODUCTION
Devising quantum computer will enable us to break public-key cryptosystems based on integer factoring (IF) and discrete
logarithm (DL) problems[17] . Under this future threat, it is important to search for secure PKEs based on the other problem.
Lattice-based PKE schemes hold a great promise for post-quantum cryptography, as they enjoy very strong security proofs
based on worst-case hardness, relatively efficient implementations, as well as great simplicity and, lately, their promising
potential as a platform for constructing advanced functionalities.
The ultimate goal of public-key encryption is the production of a simple and efficient encryption scheme that is provably
secure in a strong security model under a weak and reasonable computational assumption. The accepted notion for the security
of a public-key encryption scheme is semantically secure against adaptive chose ciphertext attack (i.e. IND-CCA2) [13] . In
this scenario, the adversary has seen the challenge ciphertext before having access to the decryption oracle. The adversary is
not allowed to ask the decryption of the challenge ciphertext, but can obtain the decryption of any relevant cryptogram (even
modified ones based on the challenge ciphertext). A cryptosystem is said to be CCA2-secure if the cryptanalyst fails to obtain
any partial information about the plaintext relevant to the challenge ciphertext.
A. Related work
In order to design CCA2-secure lattice-based encryption schemes, a lot of successes were reached. There are two approach
for constructing CCA2-secure lattice-based cryptosystems in the standard model. Existing CCA2-secure schemes exhibit various
incomparable tradeoffs between key size and error rate.
-CCA-secure cryptosystem based on lossy trapdoor functions. Peikert and Waters [11] showed for the first time how to construct
CCA2-secure encryption scheme from a primitive called a lossy ABO trapdoor function family, along with a SU-OT-SS. They
showed how to construct this primitive based on the learning with error (LWE) problem. This result is particularly important as
it gives for the first time a CCA-secure cryptosystem based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. It has public-keys
of size O(n2) bits and relies on a quite small LWE error rate of α = O(1/n4). Subsequently, Peikert [12] showed how to
construct a correlation-secure trapdoor function family from the LWE problem, and used it within the Rosen-Segev scheme
[15] to obtain another lattice-based CCA-secure scheme. Unfortunately, the latter scheme also suffers from long public-key
2and ciphertext length of O(n3) bits, but uses a better error rate of O(1/n) in the security parameter n, even if applied in the
Ring-LWE setting. Recently, Micciancio and Peikert [10] give new methods for generating simpler, tighter, faster and smaller
trapdoors in cryptographic lattices to achieve a CCA-secure cryptosystem. Their construction give a CCA-secure cryptosystem
that enjoys the best of all prior constructions, which has O(n2) bit public-keys, uses error rate O(1/n). Recently, Steinfeld et al.
[18] introduced the first CCA2-secure variant of the NTRU [9] in the standard model with a provable security from worst-case
problems in ideal lattices. They construct a CCA-secure scheme using the lossy trapdoor function, which they generalize it to
the case of (k − 1)-of-k-correlated input distributions.
-CCA-secure cryptosystem based on IBE. More constructions of IND-CCA2 secure lattice-based encryption schemes can be
obtained by using the lattice-based selective-ID secure identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes of [1], [2], [3], [4], [7], [14],
[16], [19] within the generic constructions of [5], [6], and a SU-OT-SS or commitment scheme.
All the above schemes use generic transformations from CPA to CCA2 security in the standard model, e.g., Dolev et al.
approach [8], Canetti et al. paradigm [6] or Boneh et al. approach [5]. They typically involve either a SU-OT-SS or a MAC
and commitment schemes to make the ciphertext authentic and non-malleable. So, the resulting encryption scheme requires
separate encryption and thus, it is not sufficiently efficient to be used in practice and inappropriate for many applications such
as small ubiquitous computing devices with limited resources such as smart cards, active RFID tags, wireless sensor networks
and other embedded devices.
Till date, there is no generic direct transformation from any lattice-based one-way trapdoor cryptosystem (i.e., worst-case
hardness problem in lattice) to a CCA2-secure one. In this work, for the first time, we show how to construct a CCA2-secure
cryptosystem directly based on the worst-case hardness problems in lattice, resolving a problem that has remained open till
date.
B. Our contributions
Our approach has several main benefits:
• It introduce a new generic asymmetric padding-based scheme. The main novelty is that our approach can be applied to
any conjectured (post-quantum) one-way trapdoor cryptosystem.
• Our approach yields the first known direct CCA2-secure PKE scheme from worst-case hardness problems in lattice.
• The proposed approach is a ”black-box” construction, which making it more efficient and technically simpler than those
previously proposed. The publick/secret keys are as in the original scheme and the encryption/decryption complexity are
comparable to the original scheme.
• This novel approach leads to the elimination of using generic transformations from CPA-secure schemes to a CCA2-secure
one.
• Our CCA2-security proof is tightly based on the assumption that the underlying primitive is a trapdoor one-way function.
So, the scheme’s consistency check can be directly implemented by the simulator without having access to some external
gap-oracle as in previous schemes [1], [2], [3], [7], [10], [11], [12], [14], [16], [18], [19]. Thus, our proof technique is
fundamentally different from all known approaches to obtain CCA2-security in the lattice-based cryptosystems.
• Additionally, this scheme can be used for encryption of arbitrary-length long messages without employing the hybrid
encryption method and symmetric encryption.
Organization. The rest of this manuscript is organized as follows: In the following section, we briefly explain some notations
and definitions. Then, in Section 3, we introduce our proposed scheme. Security and performance analysis of the proposed
scheme will be discussed in Section 4.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Notation
We will use standard notation. If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length. If k ∈ N, then {0, 1}k denote the set of k-bit
strings, 1k denote a string of k ones and {0, 1}∗ denote the set of bit strings of finite length. y ← x denotes the assignment
to y of the value x. For a set S, s ← S denote the assignment to s of a uniformly random element of S. For a deterministic
algorithm A, we write x ← AO(y, z) to mean that x is assigned the output of running A on inputs y and z, with access to
oracle O. We denote by Pr[E] the probability that the event E occurs. If a and b are two strings of bits, we denote by a‖b
their concatenation. The bit-length of a denoted by Len(a), Lsbx1(a) means the right x1 bits of a and Msbx2(a) means the
left x2 bits of a.
3B. Definitions
Definition 1 (Public-key encryption scheme). A public-key encryption scheme (PKE) is a triple of probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that:
• Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time key generation algorithm which takes a security parameter 1n as input and outputs
a public key pk and a secret-key sk. We write (pk, sk)← Gen(1n). The public key specifies the message space M and
the ciphertext space C.
• Enc is a (possibly) probabilistic polynomial-time encryption algorithm which takes as input a public key pk, a m ∈ M
and random coins r, and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C. We write Enc(pk,m; r) to indicate explicitly that the random coins
r is used and Enc(pk,m) if fresh random coins are used.
• Dec is a deterministic polynomial-time decryption algorithm which takes as input a secret-key sk and a ciphertext C ∈ C,
and outputs either a message m ∈M or an error symbol ⊥. We write m← Dec(C, sk).
• (Completeness) For any pair of public and secret-keys generated by Gen and any message m ∈ M it holds that
Dec(sk, Enc(pk,m; r)) = m with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by Gen and the random coins r
used by Enc.
Definition 2 (Padding scheme). Let ν, ρ, k be three integers such that ν + ρ ≤ k. A padding scheme Π consists of two
mappings pi : {0, 1}ν×{0, 1}ρ → {0, 1}k and pˆi : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ν×{0, 1}ρ∪{⊥} such that pi is injective and the following
consistency requirement is fulfilled:
∀m ∈ {0, 1}ν, r ∈ {0, 1}ρ : pˆi(pi(m, r)) = m.
Definition 3 (CCA2-security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (i.e.
IND-CCA2) if the advantage of any two-stage PPT adversary A = (A1, A2) in the following experiment is negligible in the
security parameter k:
Expcca2PKE,A(k):
(pk, sk)← Gen(1k)
(m0,m1, state)← A
Dec(sk,.)
1 (pk) s.t. |m0| = |m1|
b← {0, 1}
C∗ ← Enc(pk,mb)
b′ ← A
Dec(sk,.)
2 (C
∗, state)
if b = b′ return 1, else return 0.
The attacker may query a decryption oracle with a ciphertext C at any point during its execution, with the exception that
A2 is not allowed to query Dec(sk, .) with C∗. The decryption oracle returns b
′
← A
Dec(sk, .)
2 (C
∗, state). The attacker wins
the game if b = b′ and the probability of this event is defined as Pr[Exp cca2PKE,A (k)]. We define the advantage of A in the
experiment as
AdvIND−CCA2PKE,A (k) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[Exp cca2PKE,A (k) = 1]− 12
∣∣∣∣ .
III. THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section, we introduced our proposed CCA2-secure encryption scheme. Our scheme is a precoding-based algorithm
which can transform any one-way trapdoor cryptosystem to a CCA2-secure one in the standard model. Precoding includes a
permutation and pad some random obscure-data to the message bits.
A. The proposed idea
Let we can decide to encrypt message m ∈ {0, 1}n. At first, we perform a random encoding to the message bits. To do this,
we uniformly choose r = (r1, . . . , rk) ∈R {0, 1}k with k ≪ n at random, and, suppose wt(r) = h be the its Hamming weigh.
If n/h is an integer, then we can divide m into h blocks. Otherwise, in order to divide m into h blocks, we must pad a random
binary string (RBS) with length h . ⌈n/h⌉− n to the right of m. In each cases, we can divide m into h blocks d1‖d2‖ . . . ‖dh
with equal binary length v = ⌈n/h⌉ where dh = Lsb(n−(h−1) .⌈n/h⌉) (m)‖RBS. Therefore, if h | n, then RBS = ϕ (the
4empty set) and dh = Lsb(n−(h−1) .⌈n/h⌉) (m), else, RBS is a random block with binary length h . ⌈n/h⌉ − n and we have
dh = Lsb(n−(h−1) .⌈n/h⌉) (m)‖RBS.
Now, we perform a random permutation and pad some random obscure blocks (ROBs) with equal binary length s into the
message blocks di, 1 ≤ i ≤ h using padding scheme pi : {0, 1} × {0, 1}v → {0, 1}v × {0, 1}s, which can be defined as
follows:
pi(ri, di) = d
′
i =


d∑i
j=1
rj
if ri = 1
ROB if ri = 0
, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Notice that in order to prevent excessive increase in the message length, we can choose s small enough. The message m′ =
(d
′
1‖d
′
2‖ . . . ‖d
′
k) is called encoded message. We summarize encoding process in algorithm 1.
Algorithm 3.1: Random Encoding Algorithm.
Input: m = (m1, . . . ,mn), r ∈R {0, 1}k with n≫ k .
Output: Encoded message m′ = (d′1‖d
′
2‖ . . . ‖d
′
k).
SETUP:
1) h← wt(r).
2) If h | n then v ← n/h;
else v ← ⌈n/h⌉ and choose a RBS with binary length h · ⌈n/h⌉ − n, and
m← (m1, . . . ,mn‖ R B S︸ ︷︷ ︸
h·⌈n/h⌉−n
).
3) Divide m into h blocks (d1‖d2‖ . . . ‖dh) with equal Len(di) = v, 1 ≤ i ≤ h.
PERMUTATION AND PADDING:
1) Uniformly choose integer s at random.
2) For i = 1 to k do;
if ri = 1 then d
′
i ← d
∑
i
j=1
rj
,
else d′i ← ROB with binary length s.
Return m
′
= (d
′
1‖d
′
2‖ . . . ‖d
′
k).
We illustrate algorithm (III-A) with small example. Suppose m = (m1, . . . ,m1117) and r = (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0).
SETUP:
We have |m| = n = 1117, k = 18 and h =
∑k
i=1 ri = 11. Since 11 ∤ 1117 so we must pad a RBS with
binary length h . ⌈n/h⌉ − n = 5 to the right of m. If we uniformly chose 1, 0, 1, 1, 0 at random, we have m =
(m1, . . . ,m1117, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
h .⌈n/h⌉−n
). Since h = 11, the algorithm divides m into 11 blocks with equal length v = ⌈n/h⌉ = 102.
We have m = (m1, . . . , m102︸ ︷︷ ︸
d1
‖m103, . . . ,m204︸ ︷︷ ︸
d2
‖ . . . ‖m1020, . . . ,m1117, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
d11
), where Lsb(n−(n−1)·⌈n/h⌉) (m) =
Lsb 97 (m) = m1020, . . . ,m1117.
PERMUTATION AND PADDING:
Firstly, we choose random integer s, say s = 4. We have
r1 = 0, thus d
′
1 ← ROB#1 = (0, 1, 1, 0), where (0, 1, 1, 0) is randomly chosen by algorithm 3.1.
r2 = 1, thus d
′
2 ← d
∑
2
j=1 rj
= d1.
r3 = 0, thus d
′
3 ← ROB#2 = (1, 0, 1, 0), where (1, 0, 1, 0) is randomly chosen by algorithm 3.1.
.
.
.
r17 = 1, thus d
′
17 ← d
∑
17
j=1 rj
= d11.
r18 = 0, thus d
′
18 ← ROB#(k − h) = 7 = (0, 0, 1, 0), where (0, 0, 1, 0) is randomly chosen by algorithm 3.1.
5l − h ROB blocks with equal length s = 4 are combined with the message blocks di, 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
to produce the encoded message m′ = (d′1‖d
′
2‖ . . . ‖d
′
k). In the final, the algorithm outputs m
′
as m
′
=
(0, 1, 1, 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
′
1
‖m1, . . . , m102︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
′
2
‖ 1, 0, 1, 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
′
3
‖ . . . ‖m1020, . . . ,m1117, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
′
17
‖ ‖ 0, 0, 1, 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
d
′
18
).
As we see, the length and the position of the message blocks di are correlated to the number and the position of the random
bits ri = 1 respectively, and completely random.
B. The proposed scheme
Now, we are ready to define our proposed encryption scheme. Given a secure lattice-based encryption scheme Πlbe =
(Genlbe,Enclbe,Declbe), we construct a IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme Πcca2 = (Gencca2,Enccca2,Deccca2) as follows.
This scheme can be used for encryption of arbitrary-length long messages. System parameters. n, k ∈ N, where n≫ k.
Key generation. Let Genlbe be the Lattice-based key generator. On security parameter 1k, the generator Gencca2 runs Genlbe(1k)
to obtain
sk = sklbe and pk = pklbe.
Encryption. To encrypt message m ∈ {0, 1}n with n≫ k, Enccca2(pk,m) works as follows.
• Uniformly chooses r ∈R {0, 1}k at random and computes its Hamming weight wt(r) = h.
• Randomly chooses small integer s and executes algorithm (III-A) for generate encoded message m′ = (d′1‖d
′
2‖ . . . ‖d
′
l)
from message m.
• Suppose y be the corresponding decimal value of m′ . Computes
C1 = y · h, C2 = Enclbe(pk, r)
and outputs the ciphertext C = (C1, C2).
To handle CCA2-security and non-malleability related issues, we strictly correlate the message bits mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n to the
randomness r via encoding process. The value of y also correlates to the random binary string r via its Hamming weight
h = wt(r). So, the CCA2 adversary for extract the message blocks di from C1 must first recover exactly the same random binary
string r from lattice-based cryptosystem which is impossible, if the underlying lattice-based one-way trapdoor cryptosystem
be secure.
Decryption. Deccca2(sk, C) for extract message m performs the following steps.
• Computes random binary vector r as r = Declbe(C2, sk) and h =
∑k
i=1 ri.
• Computes y = C1/h.
• Checks whether
Len(y)
?
= h · ⌈n/h⌉ (1)
holds, and rejects if not (consistency check). If (1) hold, computes v = ⌈n/h⌉ and binary coded decimal (BCD) m′ of y.
• Computes s = (|m′|−hv)/(k−h) and rejects the ciphertext if s is not an integers (verify whether the padding information
is correct or not).
• The lengths and position of the message/ROB blocks are explicit, therefore, Deccca2 simply can separate ROB blocks
from encoded message m′ and extract message blocks di, 1 ≤ i ≤ h with the following algorithm.
Algorithm 3.2: Message Extractor.
Input: r = (r1, . . . , rk), integers h, v, s and encoded message m′.
Output: Retrieved message m = (d1‖d2‖ . . . ‖dh)
1) For i = 1 to k do
If ri = 0, then m′ ← Lsb(|m′|−s)(m′),
else d∑i
j=1
rj
← Msbv(m
′) and m′ ← Lsb(|m′|−v)(m′);
2) m← (d1‖d2‖ . . . ‖d∑k
j=1
rj
), where
∑k
i=1 ri = h.
3) If h ∤ n, then m← Msbn(m) (remove right (h.⌈n/h⌉ − n) bits of m).
Return ”m”.
6IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security analysis
In this subsection, we proof the CCA2-security of the proposed cryptosystem which is built using the pre-coding approach
with a secure lattice-based encryption scheme.
Theorem 1. : Let Πlbe = (Genlbe,Enclbe,Declbe) be a secure lattice-based encryption scheme, then the proposed scheme is
CCA2-secure in the standard model.
In the proof of security, we exploit the fact that for a well-formed ciphertext, we can recover the message if we know the
randomness r that was used to create the ciphertext.
Proof: Suppose that C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 ) be the challenge ciphertext. Let Si be the event that the adversary A wins in Game i.
Here is the sequence of games.
Game 0. We define Game 0 which is an interactive computation between an adversary A and a simulator. This game is usual
CCA2 game used to define CCA2-security, in which the simulator provides the adversary’s environment.
Initially, the simulator runs the key generation algorithm and gives the public-key to the adversary. The adversary submits
two messages m0,m1 with |m0| = |m1| to the simulator. The simulator chooses b ∈ {0, 1} at random, and encrypts mb,
obtaining the challenge ciphertext C∗ = (C∗1 , C∗2 ). The simulator gives C∗ to the adversary. We denote by r∗, h∗ = wt(r∗),
v∗ = ⌈n/h∗⌉, s∗ and y∗ = DV(m′∗) where
m′∗ = Encode(mb, r
∗, s∗) (2)
the corresponding intermediate quantities computed by the encryption algorithm, where DV means the decimal value. The only
restriction on the adversary’s requests is that after it makes a challenge request, the subsequent decryption requests must not
be the same as the challenge ciphertext. At the end of the game, the adversary A outputs b˜ ∈ {0, 1}. Let S0 be the event that
b˜ = b. Since Game 0 is identical to the CCA2 game we have that
∣∣∣∣Pr[S0]− 12
∣∣∣∣ = Advcca2Π,A (k).
and, our goal is to prove that this quantity is negligible.
Game 1. Define Game 1 as identical with Game 0, except that h = h∗.
Lemma 1. There exists an efficient adversary A1 such that:
|Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| ≤ Adv
lbe
Π,A1(k). (3)
By the assumption that the lattice-based encryption scheme is secure, we have that AdvlbeΠ,A1(k) is negligible.
Proof: Let negl(k) = |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]|. We can easily build an adversary A1 who hopes to recover mb from Game 1. In this
game, the adversary A1 queries on input(C1, C2) 6= (C∗1 , C∗2 ), while h = h∗. The simulator takes as input (C1, C2), h = h∗
and computes r = Declbe(C2, ·) 6= r∗, y = C1/h∗ 6= y∗ and so m
′
6= m′∗. If |m′ | is not equal to obvious value h∗ · ⌈n/h∗⌉,
then the simulator rejects the ciphertext in (1). Since m′ 6= m′∗, thus s = (|m′| − h∗ · v)/(k − h∗) 6= s∗ and the simulator
rejects the ciphertext if s is not an integers. Furthermore, since the position of the message/ROB blocks (r 6= r∗) and the
ROB blocks length s are not explicit, so, the output of algorithm (III-B)) is not identical to mb. Therefore, if the lattice-based
encryption scheme is secure (i.e., the adversary cannot recover r∗ from it), then the A1’s advantage of this game is exactly
equal to negl(k). By definition of AdvlbeΠ,A1(k), we have negl(k) ≤ Adv
lbe
Π,A1(k).
Remark 1. Notice that if one of the message extractor algorithm (III-B) inputs (i.e., r∗, v∗, s∗ and m′∗) is not a legitimate
input, then the output of its is not identical to mb.
Remark 2. Notice that in order to query from the simulator, the CCA2 adversary cannot modified C2 based on the challenge
ciphertext C∗2 (well-formed decryption queries). Since for correctly retrieve mb, the simulator must know the exact value of
randomness r∗. So, if the lattice-based encryption scheme is secure, then the advantage of the CCA2 adversary is negligible.
Game 2. Define Game 2 as identical with Game 1, except that C1 = C∗1 .
Lemma 2. There exists an efficient adversary A2 such that:
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ Adv
lbe
Π,A2(k) (4)
By the assumption that the lattice-based encryption scheme is secure, we have that AdvlbeA2 (k) is negligible.
7Proof: Let negl(k) = |Pr[S2]− Pr[S0]|. Consider the adversary A2 who aims to recover mb from this game. In this game, the
adversary A2 uniformly chooses C2 6= C∗2 at random and queries on input C = (C∗1 , C2), h = h∗. In this case, the decryption
simulator computes r = Declbe(C2, ·) 6= r∗. It also computes y = C1/h = y∗, v = v∗, s = s∗. Although the message/ROB
blocks length and the encoded message m′ are explicit, but since the position of the message/ROB blocks are not explicit,
r 6= r∗, thus the outputs of algorithm (III-B)) is not identical to mb. So, if the lattice-based encryption scheme is secure, then
the A2’s advantage of this game is equal to negl(k). By definition of AdvlbeΠ,A2(k), we have negl(k) ≤ Adv
lbe
Π,A2(k).
Game 3. Define Game 3 as identical with Game 0, except that C2 = C∗2 .
Lemma 3. There exists an efficient adversary A3 such that
|Pr[S3]− Pr[S0]| ≤ AdvΠ,A3(k). (5)
Proof: Suppose negl(k) = |Pr[S3]− Pr[S0]|. We can easily build an adversary A3 who wishes to recover mb from Game 3. In
this game, the adversary A3 uniformly chooses C1 6= C∗1 at random and queries on input (C1, C∗2 ). In this case, the simulator
computes r = Declbe(C∗2 , ·) = r∗, h = h∗, y = C1/h∗ 6= y∗ and so m′ 6= m′∗. If Len(y) = |m′| is not equal to obvious value
h∗ · ⌈n/h∗⌉, then the simulator rejects the ciphertext in (1). Since m′ 6= m′∗, thus s = (|m′| − h∗ · v)/(k − h∗) 6= s∗, and the
simulator rejects the ciphertext if s is not an integers. Furthermore, since the ROB blocks length s and the encoded message
m′ are not explicit, thus the outputs of algorithm (III-B)) is not identical to mb and so, the A3’s advantage of this game is
negligible. By definition of AdvΠ,A3(k), we have negl(k) ≤ AdvΠ,A3(k).
Lemma 4. We claim that
|Pr[S3]| = 1/2. (6)
Proof: Game 3 same as Game 0, except that the component C1 of the queried ciphertext C = (C1, C∗2 ) is not computed by
equation (2) but rather chosen uniformly at random. So, the queried ciphertext C is statistically independent from the challenge
bit b. Thus, the A3’s advantage in Game 3 is obviously 0, and
|Pr[S3]| =
1
2
Completing the Proof:
We can write
| Pr[S0] |= |Pr[S0] + Pr[S0]− Pr[S0] + Pr[S1]− Pr[S1] + Pr[S2]− Pr[S2]+
Pr[S3]− Pr[S3]|
So we have
|Pr[S0]| ≤ |Pr[S3]|+ |Pr[S3]− Pr[S0]|+ |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]|+ |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]|+
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S0]|
We have
|Pr[S2]− Pr[S0]| ≤ |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]|+ |Pr[S1]− Pr[S0]| (7)
From equations (3,4,5,6,7) we have:
|Pr[S0]− 1/2| ≤ AdvΠ,A3(k) + 2Adv
lbe
Π,A2(k) + 2Adv
lbe
Π,A1(k)
By assumption, the right-hand side of the above equation is negligible, which finishes the proof.
B. Performance analysis
The performance-related issues can be discussed with respect to the computational complexity of key generation, key sizes,
encryption and decryption speed, and information rate. The proposed cryptosystem features fast encryption and decryption. The
time for computing encoded message is negligible compared to the time for computing (Enclbe,Declbe). Encryption roughly
needs one application of Enclbe together a multiplication, and decryption roughly needs one application of Declbe together a
division. The public/secret keys are as in the original scheme. The length of the ciphertext is equal to n+ (k − h)s+ k. The
information rate (i.e., the ratio of the binary length of plaintext to that of the ciphertext) is equal to n/(n + (k − h)s + k),
and for n≫ k and small integer s, it is close to one. Compared to other CCA2-secure lattice-based schemes were introduced
today, our scheme is very simple and more efficient.
8V. CONCLUSION
We construct the first direct CCA2-secure variant of the lattice-based PKE scheme, in a black-box manner, with a provable
security from worst-case hardness problems in (ideal) lattices. This novel approach is very simple and more efficient and
leads to the elimination of using SU-OT-SSs or MACs for transformations CPA-secure schemes to a CCA2-secure one. We
showed that this scheme has extra advantages, namely, its IND-CCA security remains tightly related (in the standard model)
to the worst-case hardness problems in lattice. Additionally, this scheme can be used for encryption of long messages without
employing the hybrid encryption method and symmetric encryption.
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